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Compelling Experts To Testify: A Proposal
There is no consensus among American courts as to when ex-
perts should be compelled to testify.' The various rules on compul-
sion of expert testimony have developed primarily in cases in which
the experts were already involved in the litigation, either as observ-
ers of the underlying events or as expert witnesses employed by one
of the parties. More recent cases, however, have involved experts
whose connection to the litigation was more tenuous.2 When a party
is convinced that a particular expert's testimony will be favorable,
the litigant may seek that testimony without regard to the expert's
willingness to testify. For example, a litigant might subpoena an
unwilling expert who has previously expressed his opinion on a trial
issue in a publication 3 or in a prior trial of a related matter.' A party
may also wish to compel an expert to testify to his factual observa-
tions, in which case the expert's opinion would be irrelevant.' The
variety of possible situations raises the question of whether trial
courts at present are allowed sufficient flexibility to effect a fair
compromise between the competing interests involved when a liti-
gant seeks to compel an unwilling expert to testify.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze these competing
Cases concerning compulsion of expert testimony are collected in Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d
1182 (1961). Several articles have discussed the approaches used by various states. The
articles have focused primarily on expert witness fees. See, e.g., Hall, Extra Compensation
for Expert Witnesses, 2 J. FOR. Sci. 81 (1957); Porterfield, The Right to Subpoena Expert
Testimony and the Fees to Be Paid Therefor, 5 HASTINGs L.J. 50 (1953); Bomar, The Compen-
sation of Expert Witnesses, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 510 (1935); Comment, Expert Witness
Fees, 43 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 777 (1953); Comment, Requiring Experts to Testify in Maine,
20 U. ME. L. Rav. 297 (1968).
2 See, e.g., Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 820 (2d Cir. 1976); Karp v. Cooley, 349
F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Vitello, __ Mass. _ 327 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1975); In re Estate of
Rothko, 80 Misc. 2d 140, 362 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
For example, in In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, M.D.L.
No. 235 (E.D. Va.), the plaintiffs subpoenaed for deposition an economist who had written a
law review article concerning the case that reached a conclusion favorable to the plaintiffs
(notice of deposition filed, No. 77-EBD, D. Mass. Feb. 28, 1977). On May 9, 1977, the
defendants obtained a subpoena duces tecum for the expert's working papers and the magis-
trate ruled that the economist could be deposed, but the parties withdrew their subpoenas
before the district court decided the appeal (telephone interview with Clerk of District Court
of Massachusetts).
See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 929 (1973).
See, e.g., Rizzuto v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 152 So. 2d 857, 858-59 (La. Ct.
of App. 1963) (doctor testified to the extent of plaintiff's injuries without giving medical
opinion).
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interests in an effort to formulate an approach that achieves a work-
able compromise between the demands of litigants and experts. The
comment first discusses the special characteristics of expert testi-
mony and argues that these characteristics warrant treating experts
differently than other witnesses. After describing and criticizing the
procedures currently used by the courts, the comment proposes an
alternative that more adequately accommodates the competing in-
terests. Finally, the comment outlines a suggested approach to the
analogous problem of compelling experts for depositions that is con-
sistent with the suggested system for compulsion of trial testimony.
I. THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
The duty of witnesses to testify is a sacrifice due from every
member of a community.6 Expert testimony, however, differs from
ordinary testimony in two important respects. 7 First, the expert is
asked not only to report his perceptions of events he has ob-
served-as is the ordinary witness-but also to employ the resources
he has invested in his training in order to draw inferences and form
conclusions. The expert possesses a kind of equity in the substance
of his testimony that is created by his investment of resources.'
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 72 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 8
WIGMORE].
Every witness is an "expert" in the matter to which he is called to testify. Nevertheless,
two broad groupings of kinds of subjects exist: those "as to which a sufficient experience is
possessed by every person of ordinary fortunes in life," and those "as to which it is only by
means of some special and peculiar experience, more than is the common possession, that a
person becomes competent to acquire knowledge." 2 J. WIGMORE, EVDENCE § 555, at 633-34;
id. § 556, at 635 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 2 WIGMORE]. In this latter category of
expert testimony, witnesses may give opinion as well as fact testimony if the opinion will aid
the trier of fact. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 13, at 29-30 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK].
It has often been argued that experts have property rights in their expert knowledge
because of their investment in their training, and that this property right cannot constitution-
ally be taken without providing adequate compensation. This argument was accepted in a
few early cases. See, e.g., Cheatham Elec. Switching Device Co. v. Transit Dev. Co., 261 F.
792 (2d Cir. 1919); United States v. Howe, 26 F. Cas. 394 (W.D. Ark. 1881) (No. 15,404a);
Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. v. City of Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918); United States
ex rel. Rock Creek Park v. Cooper, 21 D.C. (Tuck & Cl.) 491, 497 (1893); see Friedenthal,
Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455, 479-81
(1962). The property concept has also been invoked in some recent cases. See, e.g., Peti-
tioner's Brief for Certiorari at 26, Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326 (D.R.I. 1976),
mandamus denied, No. 76-1346 (lst Cir. Aug. 17, 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1325 (1977).
Most cases have either rejected or ignored the property argument and have assumed the
power to compel experts to testify. See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 406 F. Supp. 175,
176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. IBM Corp., 406 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The
rationale usually advanced for rejecting the property argument is that the court is not asking
the expert to render professional services but is only requiring testimony as it does of all
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Second, expert testimony, unlike ordinary testimony, is often
replaceable. In the case of ordinary witnesses the litigant generally
wants the witness to testify about his perceptions of events the
litigant deems important to his case. When a litigant seeks testi-
mony from an expert that is not a simple recounting of the expert's
perceptions, however, it is likely that the testimony is available
from other sources. For example, if the litigant wishes the expert to
testify to professional standards or to employ his training to draw
inferences from basic facts, the testimony of the particular expert
is probably duplicable. So long as the testimony can be obtained
from another source, the failure to compel the expert probably will
not deprive the litigant of important evidence. The duty to testify
is a burden upon any citizen, but the inconvenience to the witness
is almost always overborne by the need of court and litigant for the
witness's unique testimony. If that testimony is not unique, how-
ever, the need for the testimony is less urgent.
I. CURRENT APPROACHES
In apparent recognition of the inherent unfairness of compelling
expert testimony and the greater replaceability of much expert tes-
timony, some courts have developed special rules concerning the
compulsion of expert testimony.' The courts have differed substan-
witnesses. See, e.g., Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 25 Am. Rep. 611 (1875); Dixon v. People,
168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897) (stating that the issue is not whether knowledge is property
but whether requiring a response to a hypothetical question is a taking of property); Dills v.
State, 59 Ind. 15, 19 (1877) (Biddle, C.J., dissenting); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6, at § 2203.
An implicit ground for the rejection of the property argument is that acceptance of the
argument would deny vast amounts of evidence to the courts since a property right would
extend to any testimony-observations as well as opinions-which depended on the expert's
training.
Nevertheless, both the states and the federal government respect the expert's interests
in his time and training. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706 (providing that a court may appoint
expert witnesses only if the expert consents). See also FED. R. CRim. P. 28; Ky. R. CalM. 9.46;
N.D.R. CaM. 28; R.I. SuPER. R. CRIM. P. 28. Consent apparently is required because a court-
appointed expert may have to do out-of-court work in addition to testifying. However, the
rule exhibits a concern for fairness to experts which goes beyond the constitutional mandate
that the expert be compensated if he is required to perform out-of-court studies.
Some courts have suggested that a party may no more compel a particular expert to
testify for him than he can compel a particular attorney to represent him. See, e.g., Cheatham
Elec. Switching Device Co. v. Transit Dev. Co., 261 F. 792 (2d Cir. 1919); United States v.
Howe, 26 F. Cas. 394 (W.D. Ark. 1881) (No. 15,404a). However, the expert is in theory
impartial and not a hired partisan; his duty to testify is owed to the court rather than to the
litigant. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2192, at 73, § 2203(2)(c), at 141.
9 In addition to the approaches discussed in the text, courts and commentators occasion-
ally have suggested applying the attorney-client privilege to experts. See State ex rel. State
Highway Dep't v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 57 Del. 40, 62-63, 193 A.2d 799, 811 (1963); City &
County of San Francisco v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 234, 231 P.2d 26, 29 (1951) (discov-
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tially in their treatment of expert witnesses. Categorization of the
approaches is difficult and possibly misleading because courts
usually deal only with the particular facts presented and do not
announce a comprehensive "approach" to the problem. Neverthe-
less, four distinct methods of dealing with the problem can be iso-
lated, each of which will be evaluated in terms of the success with
which it accommodates the interests of expert and litigant without
undue sacrifice of judicial economy.10
Most jurisdictions that have considered the problem have held
that experts can be compelled to give professional opinions that
they have formed prior to the time they are called upon to testify,"
ery); Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L.
Pav. 455 (1962); Note, Right to Compel Testimony of Expert Witness Employed by Adverse
Party, 73 DICK. L. REv. 675 (1969). The attorney-client privilege would apply when the expert
served as the attorney's agent to obtain information from the client. For example, in City &
County of San Francisco v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951), the court accorded
the privilege to a doctor who had examined a patient solely in order to report the patient's
condition to his attorney.
Bringing experts within the attorney-client privilege may shield experts from having to
testify to either facts or opinions. Such a privilege could coexist with any of the other ap-
proaches used to compel expert testimony; however, the privilege would apply only to infor-
mation obtained from a client and not to information independently developed by the expert.
See City & County of San Francisco, id. at 238, 231 P.2d at 29-30. Thus, the information that
is most likely to be irreplaceable-that reported by the client-would be protected while
information that could be duplicated by other experts could be compelled. Furthermore, the
expert could not assert the privilege if his client waived it. See, e.g., State ex rel. State
Highway Dep't v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 15 Del. at 75, 193 A.2d at 817.
11 Constitutional problems may exist if a criminal defendant cannot obtain expert testi-
mony, either because the expert resists the subpoena or because the defendant cannot afford
to pay the expert's fee. See People v. Watson, 36 111. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966); Flores v.
State, 491 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (right
of confrontation includes right to expose witness's record of juvenile delinquency and present
-probationary status in order to show the existence of possible bias and prejudice, despite state
policy of preserving confidentiality of juvenile court records); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14 (1967) (right to compulsory process cannot be limited by state's arbitrary refusal to allow
co-conspirator to testify). But see Commonwealth v. Vitello, - Mass .... 327
N.E.2d 819, 827 (1975).
1 Courts in sixteen jurisdictions that do not compensate experts will compel experts to
testify to already-formed opinions. See, e.g., Flinn v. Prairie County, 60 Ark. 204, 207, 29 S.W.
459, 459 (1895); Town of Thomaston v. Ives, 156 Conn. 166, 239 A.2d 515 (1968); Bradley v.
Davidson, 47 App. D.C. 266 (1918); Dixon v. State, 12 Ga. App. 17, 76 S.E. 794 (1912); Dixon
v. People, 168 111. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Wright v. People, 112 Ill. 540, 544 (1884); Swope
v. State, 145 Kan. 928, 67 P.2d 416 (1937); Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency v.
Fledderman, 419 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1967); Barrus v. Phaneuf, 166 Mass. 123, 44 N.E. 141
(1896): Stevens v. Worcester, 196 Mass. 45, 81 N.E. 907 (1907); Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp.
v. Cather, 208 Miss. 268, 44 So. 2d 405 (1950); State v. Bell, 212 Mo. 111, 126-27, 111 S.W.
24, 28 (1908); Main v. Sherman County, 74 Neb. 155, 103 N.W. 1038 (1905); Pengelly v.
Commissioners, 8 Ohio N.P. 386, 620 (1901); Mount v. Welsh, 118 Or. 568, 585, 247 P. 815,
821 (1926); Flores v. State, 491 S.W.2d 144, 147-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Summers v. State,
5 Tex. Civ. Cas. 365, 377-78 (1879); State ex rel. Berge v. Superior Ct., 154 Wash. 144, 281
P. 335 (1929); Ealy v. Shelter Ice Cream Co., 108 W. Va. 184, 150 S.E. 539 (1929). Some courts
Compelling Experts to Testify
but cannot be compelled to perform out-of-court work." The rule
that experts must testify to already-formed opinions is underprotec-
tive of experts, since they can be compelled to testify regardless of
whether the testimony is available from other sources. For example,
a famous surgeon could be compelled to give his opinion in every
malpractice case involving an operating procedure of which he dis-
approves. 3 Also, requiring courts to determine whether an opinion
is "already-formed" may impose administrative costs on the judi-
cial system."
In contrast, the courts of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsyl-
vania have adopted a rule that is designed to protect the expert's
investment in his training. Under the New York rule, experts cannot
be compelled to give expert opinion testimony. 5 This approach cre-
have hinted that even extra out-of-court work could be demanded of expert witnesses. See,
e.g., Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 397, 25 Am. Rep. 611 (1875); Logan v. Chatham County,
113 Ga. App. 491, 148 S.W.2d 471 (1966). Three jurisdictions provide by statute that experts
may be compelled to testify without special compensation. See ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 366 (1960);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-12 (Bums 1973); MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 25-414 (1967). The
Indiana and Alabama statutes specify that expert opinion testimony can be compelled; the
Montana statute merely states that an expert witness need not be paid more than the ordi-
nary witness fee.
It appears from the cases that courts in the foregoing states have little or no discretion
to refuse to compel experts to give opinion testimony. In Massachusetts, however, trial courts
may, in their discretion, refuse to compel experts to give opinion testimony. See text and
notes at notes 25-28 infra.
1 Most cases classify opinions as already-formed or requiring out-of-court work. See,
e.g., Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp. v. Cather, 208 Miss. 268, 280-81, 44 So. 2d 405 (1950); Ex
parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 25 Am. Rep. 611 (1875). These cases fail to note an intermediate
category: "newly-formed opinions," opinions not formed when the expert takes the stand but
that would not require out-of-court work. These would in most cases be opinions formed in
response to hypothetical questions that set out facts which the expert has not observed. The
question of whether newly-formed opinions can be compelled has not often arisen because
the subpoenaed expert in the typical case is acquainted with the facts and therefore presuma-
bly has already formed opinions from those facts. A few cases that identify themselves as
following the majority approach have explicitly drawn a line between already-formed and
newly-formed opinions, holding that the latter cannot he compelled. See, e.g., Kaufman v.
Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 819 (2d Cir. 1976); State ex rel. Berge v. Superior Ct., 154 Wash.
144, 281 P. 375 (1929) (Holcomb, J., concurring). The apparent rationale for the distinction
is that asking the expert to form a new opinion on the stand is more like forcing the expert
to do out-of-court work for a party than it is like asking the expert to testify to what he already
knows.
13 Cf. Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974). In Karp,
the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against Dr. Denton Cooley for implanting a me-
chanical heart in her husband. The plaintiff subpoenaed Dr. Michael DeBakey, the President
of Baylor Medical School, knowing that DeBakey disapproved the use of such mechanical
devices. Under the approach requiring experts to testify to already-formed opinions, Dr.
DeBakey could be compelled to testify in every case involving the use of mechanical organs.
1, This would be the case if the line between testimony which can and cannot be com-
pelled were drawn between already-formed and newly-formed opinions; see note 12 supra.
15 See, e.g., Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 517, 37 A.2d 53, 56 (1944); Stanton v. Rush-
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ates more problems than it solves, however. First, it is underprotec-
tive of experts because it does not excuse their appearance at trial
even though only fact testimony can be compelled. In a malpractice
action alleging that an operation had been negligently performed,
for example, a doctor who has no connection to the litigation could
be compelled to describe how he normally performs similar opera-
tions.
Second, the approach necessitates question-by-question classi-
fication of testimony and thus can be costly to administer. The trial
court frequently will encounter interruptions as the expert objects
to questions on the ground that the litigant is seeking to elicit opin-
ion testimony. The court will be required to ascertain the object of
the questioning and to distinguish between expert fact and expert
opinion, an often difficult task. For example, in People ex rel. Krau-
shaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe,6 the court held that an expert who
previously had appraised the property in question could be com-
pelled to testify to his observations of the property but not to his
opinions. At trial the court would have to decide whether, for in-
stance, questions asking about the state of repair of the heating
system called for fact or opinion testimony.
A third and more serious defect of this approach is that it
inadequately protects the interests of the litigant who seeks to com-
pel the testimony. Expert opinion is not necessarily duplicable, or
may be duplicable only at great expense." Under the New York rule
the litigant could be deprived of evidence altogether on an issue
relevant to the litigation. The approach affords trial courts insuffi-
cient latitude to weigh the needs of litigants.
A number of states alleviate the unfairness inherent in compel-
ling expert testimony by compensating the expert. 8 In these states
more, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A.2d 721, 721-22 (1934); Braverman v. Braverman, 21 N.J. Super.
367, 91 A.2d 226, 227 (1952) (New Jersey cases); People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v.
Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 225, 72 N.E.2d 165, 165-66 (1947); People ex rel. Deuel v. Shaw, 259
App. Div. 977, 977-78, 20 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1940) (New York cases); Evans v. Otis Elevator Co.,
403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573, 580 (1961); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. v. City of Philadelphia, 262
Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918) (Pennsylvania cases). See also Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827,
836 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
18 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947).
7 For example, if the plaintiff's property in Thorpe had been destroyed or substantially
altered and no other appraiser had appraised the property during the relevant time period,
the appraiser's testimony would not be duplicable. See text and notes at notes 45-46 and text
at note 56 infra.
11 The following states make statutory provision for additional compensation for experts:
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 68092.5 (West 1976) (additional compensation solely for opinion testi-
mony); COLO. Rzv. STAT. § 13-33-102(4) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-260 (West Supp.
1976) (additional compensation only for "practitioners of the healing arts, . . . dentist[s]
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experts can be compelled to give expert fact and opinion testimony
in exchange for a fee in excess of the ordinary witness fee. This
method has several advantages over the New York approach, the
most obvious being its ease of administration. The administrative
costs are simply those of determining the appropriate compensa-
tion. Difficult distinctions between fact and opinion testimony need
not be drawn, and the frequent interruptions engendered by the
New York approach are avoided. The compensation method also
reconciles the competing interests more satisfactorily: the litigant
is always assured of needed evidence, and the expert is roughly
recompensed for his time and effort, although he is not, of course,
paid enough to induce him to testify. The compensation approach
does not truly weigh the unfairness to the expert against the liti-
gant's need for the testimony, but it simply assumes that the liti-
gant's need should predominate.
The New York and compensation approaches remedy one form
of unfairness to experts, but do not remedy the unfairness of coerc-
ing the presence of an expert whose testimony could be substantially
duplicated. Recognizing this, courts have on occasion excused the
expert's appearance altogether upon a motion to quash the sub-
poena. 9 A subpoena can be quashed in the federal system if the trial
court determines that it would be unreasonable or oppressive to
or real estate appraisers"); DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 8906 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.06 (West
1973) (expert opinion testimony may be compelled in criminal cases in exchange for fee to
be set by court); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.72 (West Supp. 1977) (for expert opinions in any
branch of science or for studies made in scientific and professional fields not more than $150
per day is allowed); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3666A (West 1968); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 16, §
251 (1976 Supp.); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2164(1), 775.13 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
357.25 (West 1966); NEv. REv. STAT. § 18.010(2) (1973) (fees of not more than $250 for each
of three experts are taxable as costs); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-4(B) (1975 Supp.); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-314(d) (1975 Supp.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-06 (1975 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 1554 (1970) (expert fees allowed only in actions brought by state); VA. CODE § 14.1-
190 (1976 Supp.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.04(2) (West 1977) (not more than $25); Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-195 (1975 Supp.) ($25 per day or such amount as the court shall allow).
Caselaw in eight of these states has established that opinion testimony can be compelled.
McLenahan v. Keyes, 188 Cal. 574, 206 P. 454 (1922); Board of Comm'rs v. Lee, 3 Colo. App.
177, 32 P. 841 (1893); Town of Thomaston v. Ives, 156 Conn. 166, 239 A.2d 515 (1968);
Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303 (Me. 1966); State v. Teipner, 36
Minn. 535, 32 N.W. 678 (1887); Le Mere v. McHale, 30 Minn. 410, 15 N.W. 682 (1883); State
ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Steinkraus, 76 N.M. 617, 417 P.2d 431 (1966); Bradley v.
Poole, 187 Va. 432, 47 S.E.2d 341 (1948) (but see Cooper v. Norfolk Redev. & Housing Auth.,
197 Va. 653, 90 S.E.2d 788 (1956)); Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829
(1909). The only North Carolina case in point suggests that expert opinion testimony can be
compelled. In re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156 S.E. 791 (1931) (dictum).
1, See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); People v. Rhone, 267 Cal. App. 2d 652, 73 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1968); Commonwealth v. Vitello, - Mass. -, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975).
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enforce it.2" The standard appears to be similar or identical in the
states.21 State and federal appellate courts reviewing trial court rul-
ings on motions to quash under the abuse of discretion standard
have upheld refusals to compel the appearance of experts for various
reasons: because the expert had no connection with the litigation,12
because the expert lacked unique knowledge,23 or because the expert
had been hired by the opposing party.24
The decision whether to quash generally lies within the trial
court's discretion. In Massachusetts, however, it appears that trial
courts must quash subpoenas for expert testimony under certain
circumstances. In Commonwealth v. Vitello, 5 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court upheld a trial court's refusal to enforce a
subpoena for an expert who had testified at a preliminary hearing
that voiceprints were a reliable identification technique. The court
recognized that the expert could have given relevant testimony
about the value of voiceprints. Nevertheless, the court held that "a
party may not by summons compel the involuntary testimony of an
expert witness solely for the expertise he may bring to the trial, and
in the absence of any 'personal knowledge on his part related to the
issues before the judge and the jury. '26 For support the court relied
on its decision in Ramacorti v. Boston Redevelopment Authority,2
which held that a trial court has discretion to refuse to compel a
testifying expert to state already-formed opinions. Vitello goes be-
yond Ramacorti in recognizing lack of personal knowledge as a per
se ground for quashing a subpoena.
The Vitello decision is a salutary one in that it recognizes the
importance of the non-uniqueness of the expert's knowledge. The
per se rule, however, does not give sufficient weight to the litigant's
need for relevant testimony. Not all expert testimony is, as a practi-
The standard applied by the federal courts to quash subpoenas ad testificandum has
been, by analogy to the standards for subpoenas duces tecum, that the subpoena be
"unreasonable or oppressive." See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 406 F. Supp. 175, 175
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Broome v. Simon, 255 F. Supp. 434, 437 (W.D. La. 1966) ("[t]o protect
the witness from 'annoyance, embararssment or oppression' "); FED. R. Cirv. P. 45(b).
21 See, e.g., People v. Rhone, 267 Cal. App. 2d 652, 73 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1968); Ryan v.
Temporary State Comm'n, 33 Misc. 2d 1094, 228 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 16 App. Div.
2d 1022, 230 N.Y.S.2d 97, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 708, 186 N.E.2d 121, 233 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1962);
Glasper v. Westbo, 59 Wash. 2d 596, 369 P.2d 313 (1962).
22 Young v. Metropolitan Dade County, 201 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See
Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974) (semble).
City and County of Honolulu v. Bonded Inv. Co., 54 Haw. 385, 507 P.2d 1084 (1973).
24 !d.; L'Etoile v. Director of Public Works, 89 R.I. 394, 153 A.2d 173 (1959).
21 - Mass. -, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975).
28 Id. at -, 327 N.E.2d at 827.
341 Mass. 377, 170 N.E.2d 323 (1960).
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cal matter, replaceable.28 A better approach would guide and control
rather than eliminate trial court discretion.
In his opinion in the case of Kaufman v. Edelstein,21 Judge
Friendly listed considerations that should be the starting point for
the development of coherent guidelines to assist trial courts in de-
ciding whether to compel expert testimony:
Appropriate factors for consideration-some pointing against a
dispensation and some for one-would be the degree to which
the expert is being called because of his knowledge of facts
relevant to the case rather than in order to give opinion testi-
mony; the difference between testifying to a previously formed
or expressed opinion and forming a new one; the possibility
that, for other reasons, the witness is a unique expert; the
extent to which the calling party is able to show the unlikeli-
hood that any comparable witness will willingly testify; the
degree to which the witness is able to show that he has been
oppressed by having continually to testify; and undoubtedly,
many others.3 1
Judge Friendly's opinion will doubtless be influential; however, the
opinion simply lists the relevant considerations and does not give
any guidance on how they are to be applied. The establishment of
well-defined standards to guide the balancing of litigants' and ex-
perts' interests is essential to achieving fair and consistent results
and administrative efficiencies.
III. A PROPOSED COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
A. The Decision to Compel the Expert to Appear at Trial
Judicial economies can be effected by minimizing the time and
effort invested in deciding whether an expert will be compelled to
testify and what he will be compelled to testify about. The drain on
judicial resources should be minimized by eliminating the question-
by-question determinations required under the New York approach
and instead requiring the court to make but a single determination
whether to compel the testimony. That determination is most ap-
propriately and conveniently made upon the expert's motion to
quash."
2 See text and notes at notes 45-46 and 56 infra.
- 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
"Id. at 822.
3' No court supervision is exercised over the issuance of subpoenas; parties may obtain
subpoenas in blank from court clerks. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a). An unwilling witness
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In ruling on motions to quash, the court should focus on the
issue of duplicability.32 Whether an expert's testimony is duplicable
usually depends on the source of the expert's knowledge, and in
most cases the source can be easily ascertained. Expert witnesses
can be divided into three categories based on the source of the
expert's relevant knowledge. The first category, "occurrence wit-
nesses," consists of experts who have obtained their knowledge by
direct observation of or participation in events of relevance to the
litigation.3 3 The second category, "general experts," is made up of
experts who have neither observed the relevant events nor specially
studied the particular facts in the case. The third category,
"intermediate experts" consists of experts, who, because of studies
they have done, have become familiar with particular facts of the
case.3 4 Only "occurrence expert" testimony can be presumed to be
unique; the testimony of general and intermediate experts cannot.
The standards governing compulsion of expert testimony should
may not wait until the time specified for his testimony to raise his objections to the sub-
poenas. Instead, those objections must be raised on a motion to quash. 5A MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACICE 45.03[61, at 45-21 (2d ed. 1975).
In his concurring opinion in Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 822-24 (2d Cir. 1976),
Judge Gurfein noted the burden placed on an expert witness by requiring him to hire an
attorney to contest the subpoena and raised the question of whether parties should be re-
quired to state what testimony would be sought from the expert prior to the issuance of a
subpoena. Since even those experts who are willing to testify may be subpoenaed to assure
their attendance on a specific day, cf. Bradley v. Poole, 187 Va. 432, 47 S.E.2d 341 (1948)
(expert was willing to testify but refused to delay vacation even when summoned), or to
entitle the expert to witness fees, e.g., TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1080 (Vernon 1966),
a pre-subpoena showing would radically disrupt the normal subpoena procedure and would
entail large administrative expense. The consumption of judicial resources that would result
outweighs the interests of the few unwilling experts who might benefit from such a pre-
subpoena showing.
32 See text following note 7 supra. The other major difference between expert and ordi-
* . nary witnesses that results in unfairness to experts when they are compelled to testify, their
equity in the substance of their testimony, can be mitigated by provision for expert compensa-
tion. See text and notes at notes 62-65 infra.
3 Professor Graham has suggested the term "occurrence witnesses" to describe experts
who were actors in or contemporaneous viewers of events forming the basis of litigation. See
Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
An Analytical Study (pt. 1), 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 941.
1 The distinction between the kind of facts known to the general expert and that kind
known to the intermediate expert corresponds roughly to Professor Davis's distinction be-
tween legislative and adjudicative facts:
[Facts are of two kinds-adjudicative and legislative. Adjudicative facts are the facts
about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts
usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive
or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case.
Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972).
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depend on the type of expert testimony sought to be compelled.
1. Occurrence Experts. Occurrence experts are witnesses who
directly observed conditions or events pertinent to the litigation.
The occurrence expert differs from the ordinary witness in that he
employed his special training in perceiving the relevant events. For
example, this category would include a physician who had treated
or examined an accident victim, but would not include a physician
who had merely observed the accident. Because occurrence experts
possess irreplaceable information, their testimony is like that of the
ordinary witness, and they should be subject to the standards for
compulsion applicable to ordinary witnesses. Subpoenas directed to
such experts should be quashed only if it would be "unreasonable
or oppressive" to compel the testimony.
Determining which experts may be classified as occurrence wit-
nesses may be difficult when the alleged wrong occurred over an
extended period of time." The focus of the inquiry in classifying the
expert is whether it is central to the expert's value as a witness that
he acquired his knowledge at a particular point in time. For exam-
ple, in Kaufman v. Edelstein,3" an antitrust case, two computer
experts had been employed by a major accounting firm to advise
clients on the purchase of computer systems. The government sub-
poenaed the experts to testify about the recommendations they had
made to customers and their opinions of the relative merits of var-
ious computer systems. 7 As participants in the computer industry
and observers of IBM's marketing practices, the experts should be
classified as occurrence experts and thus compelled to testify in the
absence of exceptional circumstances.
2. General Experts. General experts are experts unacquainted
with the particular facts at issue in the litigation. An example is a
physician who has never treated or examined the victim in a mal-
practice action who is called to testify concerning accepted medical
standards.3 Because the presumption of uniqueness is not justified
1 In general, the distinction will not be a difficult one to make. Moreover, the approach
advocated puts a relatively small premium on correct classification of experts; even occur-
rence expert witnesses will be compensated if the litigants draw upon their expertness.
See text following note 64 infra.
- 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
The Government proposed to ask the witnesses about their prior expressed opinions
"concerning the nature and structure of the general purpose electronic digital computer
systems market" from 1960 to 1972, and also to ask them "to explain the nature of their duties
as computer systems analysts, and especially to recount the advice which they gave to users
and potential users." The Government disclaimed any intention of asking the witnesses for
"their expert evaluation of the government's evidence." 539 F.2d at 812-13.
See, e.g,, Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
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in the case of a general expert, the expert should not be compelled,
on his motion to quash a subpoena issued for his appearance, to
demonstrate the oppressiveness or unreasonableness of the sub-
poena in order to avoid compulsion. When a general expert moves
to quash a subpoena the motion should be granted unless the liti-
gant can show exceptional circumstances.
In most cases, the litigant will be unable to show exceptional
circumstances because it is likely that he could find another general
expert willing to testify. Moreover, even if the litigant cannot obtain
the oral testimony of a willing expert, other sources of the needed
evidence may be available. Publications,3 9 judicial notice,4 prior
testimony of an expert,4' or testimony of a willing expert about the
opinions of an unwilling expert 42 may be adequate substitutes for
the testimony of the unwilling general expert.43 The litigant should
be required to demonstrate the nonduplicability of the expert's tes-
timony because he probably will be in a better position than the
expert to assess the adequacy and availability of alternatives and
because he, and not the expert, stands to benefit from compulsion
of the testimony.44
If a general expert's testimony is otherwise unavailable, how-
ever, the litigant has a strong claim to the testimony. Opinion testi-
mony of a general expert may be unavailable, for example, if no
other willing expert would draw the same conclusions.4 5 Although
" The hearsay exception allowing the introduction of a learned treatise as a substitute
for expert testimony is usually limited to established authorities in "history, medicine, or
other science or art." E.g., FED. R. Evm. 803.
11 Judicial notice may substitute for expert testimony, for example, where the facts
noticed are not in dispute or where the issue is the preliminary determination that a scientific
technique is accepted in the profession. See McCoRMCK, supra note 7, at §§ 330-32.
1, Because prior recorded testimony typically cannot be used unless the expert is unavail-
able, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1), this hearsay exception cannot be invoked to substitute for
the testimony of an expert within the court's jurisdiction. It may, however, provide a good
substitute for the testimony of a different unwilling expert. See text and notes at notes 47-48
infra.
12 In some jurisdictions this alternative may be restricted by the requirement that the
expert base his testimony only on information introduced or admissible as evidence. See, e.g.,
State v. David, 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942). To some extent all expert testimony is
based on information supplied by other experts. See, e.g., Ryan v. Payne, 446 S.W.2d 273
(Ky. 1969); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 665(b).
11 Requiring a party to use alternative means of presenting the evidence may diminish
its impact. For example, the subpoenaed expert may be a better witness than other experts,
or using a learned treatise may be less effective than presenting a live witness. These differ-
ences will be insignificant in preliminary matters or trials to the bench. In jury trials, how-
ever, the judge will have to evaluate whether the available alternative means are reasonable
substitutes for the unwilling expert in assessing the litigant's need for that expert's testimony.
IL The subpoenaed expert, of course, should be free to produce another willing expert.
4 For example, only one doctor may believe that marijuana is the preferred treatment
for glaucoma.
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fact testimony of a general expert may be replicable in theory, in
practice there may be situations in which it is reproducible only
with exorbitant expenditures of time or money.46 In order to obtain
the testimony of the expert witness of his choice, the calling party
should show that he has made a good-faith effort to obtain other
experts at the going rate and that alternative means of introducing
the evidence are not available.
If the litigant shows that no willing expert is available at a
reasonable price and that the evidence cannot be obtained by means
other than the oral testimony of an expert, the court must then
determine whether the subpoenaed expert should testify, rather
than some other unwilling expert.47 The court should compare the
hardship on the subpoenaed expert to the probable hardship on
other experts. In making this comparison, factors such as the num-
ber of times the expert has been compelled to testify, the expert's
affiliation with the litigation or the parties, the distance the expert
must travel to testify, and other commitments of the expert should
be considered. The court should refuse to compel the unwilling ex-
pert to testify only if these factors indicate that it is unreasonable
to do so."
The reasonableness of according general experts such a strong
presumption against testifying is demonstrated by recent cases in
which courts have shown a reluctance to compel testimony of gen-
eral experts. For example, in In re Estate of Rothko49 a New York
court refused to compel an art dealer to testify about the valuation
of paintings because the expert was not familiar with the particular
paintings involved in the case." Although the art dealer could have
4' For example, the testimony, in a pesticide poisoning case, of a scientist who had
performed a long-range study of the effects of the pesticide could not reasonably be duplicated
by requiring other experts to perform similar studies. This problem will arise, however, only
in jurisdictions in which experts may base their opinions only on information in evidence; in
other jurisdictions, a willing expert could testify based on the unwilling expert's studies even
though the studies would not be admissible under the hearsay exception for learned treatises.
17 The court might conclude that the litigant may compel an expert other than the
subpoenaed expert to testify. For example, the fact that a party requires favorable medical
testimony does not necessarily mean that the country's foremost specialist in the field should
have to testify if other, lesser known doctors would give the same testimony. See, e.g., Karp
v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 845 (1974).
11 The "unreasonable" standard seems appropriate since a less stringent standard for
compulsion would place an undue burden on the litigant who has already shown his need for
the testimony and his inability to obtain willing general experts.
4, 80 Misc. 2d 140, 362 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sur. Ct. 1974).
The art dealer had earlier given an affidavit to the executors of the estate, describing
pricing practices in the sale of paintings to dealers. The affidavit had been filed but was not
in evidence. Id. at 141, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
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described such practices in general, the court held that the testi-
mony sought could not be compelled under the New York rule since
it was opinion testimony, not fact testimony.5 1 Similarly, in the
Vitello case 2 the court refused to compel the testimony of a voice-
print expert who had voluntarily testified at a preliminary hearing,
stating that the expert could not be compelled because he had no
personal knowledge of the facts of the case. The rationales of Rothko
and Vitello would appear to preclude the compulsion of general
expert testimony regardless of whether the calling party could ob-
tain the needed evidence elsewhere. In contrast, under the proposed
approach to compelling general experts, a litigant would be afforded
the opportunity to demonstrate that the testimony of the subpoe-
naed expert is effectively irreplaceable.5 3
3. Intermediate Experts. Whether to compel experts in the
intermediate category-experts acquainted with facts peculiar to
the litigation by virtue of studies they have performed 54-is perhaps
the most difficult problem. The testimony of intermediate experts
is generally duplicable, at least in theory, because it is not testi-
mony about immediate perceptions. The major distinction between
intermediate and general experts is that the latter's testimony is
usually replaceable by the litigant at lower cost. However, this dis-
tinction should not be dispositive of the initial presumption of
uniqueness; the cost of replacement usually will be better known to
the litigant than to the subpoenaed expert, for only the litigant
1, See text and note at note 15 supra.
52- Mass. , - 327 N.E.2d 819, 827 (1975).
The executors in Rothko apparently could have shown that other experts would not
have testified willingly. 80 Misc. 2d at 141, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 674-75.
-" This category can be subdivided into four types: experts who acquired their knowledge
of the events in issue by virtue of independent studies not connected with the case at issue;
experts who performed studies on the subject for other litigation; experts informally consulted
by the opposing party in this litigation; and experts specially retained by the opposing party
for this litigation.
The courts have divided on the question whether a party can compel the testimony of
an opposing party's expert who otherwise would not be called to testify. Cases allowing the
opponent's expert to be called, although there was no indication 'that the party did not have
other expert testimony available, include Town of Thomaston v. Ives, 156 Conn. 166, 239 A.2d
515 (1968); Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency v. Fledderman, 419 S.W.2d 741 (Ky.
1967) (unclear whether expert objected); City of Buffalo v. Ives, 55 Misc. 2d 730, 286 N.Y.S.2d
517 (S. Ct. 1968) (expert's report was prepared at public expense); State ex reL State High-
way Comm'n v. Steinkraus, 76 N.M. 617, 417 P.2d 431 (1966) (the report was prepared at
public expense; the expert did not object to testifying); State Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 80
S.D. 139, 143 N.W.2d 88 (1966) (expert did not object). The party was not allowed to call
the opponent's expert in the following cases: Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F.
Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941) (following state law): City and County of Honolulu v. Bonded Inv.
Co., 54 Haw. 385, 507 P.2d 1084 (f973); Ramacorti v. Boston Redev. Auth., 341 Mass. 377,
170 N.E.2d 323 (1960); Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961).
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knows precisely what he wants. The intermediate expert should
therefore also be accorded the benefit of a presumption that his
testimony is replaceable. This presumption will be more frequently
overcome, however, when the subpoenaed expert comes within the
intermediate category. 55
The testimony of an intermediate expert may be irreplaceable
because of changes in the condition of the subject matter the expert
has studied or the loss of the data necessary to perform a similar
study. If the litigant shows that the expert's studies cannot be re-
produced the motion to quash should be denied absent, of course, a
showing of oppressiveness or unreasonableness. 6 On the other hand,
if the subject matter of the earlier study is intact, the study could
in principle be reproduced by a second expert. The presumption of
duplicability would be rebutted, however, if the litigant shows that
alternative sources are inadequate and that he has made a good
faith effort to obtain experts but has been unsuccessful either in
hiring an expert at all or obtaining one who would testify favorably.
Although litigants should not be encouraged to wait to see if they
can avoid obtaining their own experts, neither should they be de-
prived of evidence altogether.
These proposed standards for compelling intermediate experts
to testify parallel those suggested for the compulsion of general
expert testimony. 7 But if the litigant contends that it is unfair to
require him to hire an expert to duplicate the unwilling expert's
study merely because of the attendant cost and delay, no parallel
to the standards proposed for general experts exists. In this case, the
court should consider whether it is unreasonable to force such dupli-
cation. The court should not interpret this "unreasonableness"
standard so broadly as to condemn any duplication; duplication of
effort is often tolerated in an adversary system. 8 If the party has
other experts who have done the requisite studies, for example,
fairness to the unwilling expert should automatically overcome the
litigant's desire to present cumulative testimony.
In sum, if the court is satisfied that the litigant cannot hire an
expert to duplicate the studies, that any hired experts will only give
" Other means of presenting the testimony are unlikely to be available when an interme-
diate expert is sought to be compelled because the testimony involves facts specific to the
litigation. Learned treatises will usually not discuss such facts; few experts are likely to be
informed of the facts at issue in any particular litigation; and prior recorded testimony on
the same issues involved in the current litigation will rarely exist.
1, See text and notes at notes 20-21 supra.
'1 See text and notes at notes 45-48 supra.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
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less favorable testimony, that alternative sources are not available,
or that it would be unreasonable to force him to hire a second expert
to duplicate the work performed by the subpoenaed expert, it should
deny the expert's motion to quash the subpoena unless the expert
can show that other experts have performed similar studies. In the
event other experts have specially studied the subject matter and
reached similar conclusions, the court must face the issue of equity
among unwilling experts. The subpoena should be quashed if the
expert's special circumstances indicate that it would be unfair to
compel him rather than the other expert to appear. This determina-
tion would, as in the similar situation involving general experts,
turn on such factors as the number of times the expert has been
-compelled to testify, the distance the expert must travel to testify,
and the expert's other commitments. If the subpoenaed expert had
been hired or consulted by the opposing party, the court should
consider whether it is fair to that party to compel his expert to
appear at the behest of his opponent. 9
B. The Scope of the Testimony
A significant burden is imposed on the expert when he is com-
pelled to appear at trial regardless of the extent to which the litigant
draws upon his special learning."0 Little additional burden is im-
posed upon the expert witness by requiring him to testify to all
relevant knowledge. Moreover, the court will be relieved of the diffi-
cult task of distinguishing among kinds of expert testimony on a
question-by-question basis if the scope of the expert's testimony is
not limited. Occurrence witnesses should therefore be required to
testify to any knowledge gained from special studies of the matter
in issue,6" and both occurrence and intermediate expert witnesses
11 This consideration is analogous to the "good cause" showing required of a party under
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (A) (ii) to obtain discovery of the opponent's expert witness. In addi-
tion, the calling party should be required to reimburse the opposing party for a portion of
the costs associated with retaining that expert for the litigation. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4)(C) (requiring similar payments for discovery of an expert's information). If an expert
employed or consulted by the opposing party in anticipation of litigation is compelled to
testify, that employment should not be revealed to the jury since the party was under no
obligation to call the expert as a witness. See, e.g., Logan v. Chatham County, 113 Ga. App.
491, 148 S.E.2d 471 (1966); Niemarm v. State, 471 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). But
see Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Phillips, 252 Ark. 206, 478 S.W.2d 27 (1972).
Not only must the expert spend time testifying, he might also feel compelled to prepare
for his testimony in order not to appear ill-informed. This "vanity" problem has been noted.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165, 166
(1947); Commonwealth v. Cochran, 14 Pa. Dist. 805 (1905). This problem, however, should
not affect the court's decision whether to compel expert testimony.
11 For a discussion of the analogous problem in discovery when an expert has been
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should be compelled to testify about their general knowledge of a
field.
Any unfairness visited upon the expert by compelling testi-
mony other than occurrence testimony 2 can be mitigated by requir-
ing the calling party to compensate the expert. The question of
proper compensation traditionally has been intimately bound up
with the question of whether the expert should be compelled to
testify. Under current approaches, it is clear that an expert has no
right to demand additional fees as a precondition to testifying, 3 but
some jurisdictions provide that courts may award additional fees as
a matter of fairness.64 Under the proposed standard, an unwilling
specially retained in anticipation of litigation and is also an occurrence witness, see Com-
ment, Discovery of Expert Information Under the Federal Rules, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 706
(1976).
,2 This unfairness to experts is particularly acute when an expert who has gained most
of his knowledge by study also possesses some occurrence evidence. For example, an econo-
mist who has studied price-fixing in an industry normally would not be compelled to testify
because he is an intermediate witness. If, however, some of the documents which he has seen
are later missing, a party may wish to call him to establish the previous existence of these
documents. Even if the expert has not relied on these documents in forming his opinions, so
that his testimony is replaceable, he would be an occurrence witness as to the existence of
the documents. If the expert could be compelled to testify to the existence of the documents,
he could, under the proposed system, be compelled to give his opinions from his study as well.
The expert's only argument against being required to testify to his expert opinion would be a
claim that his testimony regarding the existence of the documents was not expert testimony,
and that since he had not been compelled to testify as an expert, he should not have to give
any expert testimony. The litigant could contend, however, that the expert's knowledge of
the character of the missing documents depended on his expert training, so that all of the
testimony was expert testimony.
The proposed system, with its unlimited scope of testimony, may encourage parties to
contend that intermediate experts are, in fact, occurrence witnesses. It will be difficult to
resist this inference if the expert has had contact with witnesses other than the client (com-
munications with the client may be protected under the attorney-client privilege, see note 9
supra). But see text and notes at notes 71-74 infra.
11 The few cases that have held otherwise have either been overturned or have been
ignored. See note 8 supra; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6, at § 2203, at 137-38.
91 See note 18 supra. In order to avoid administrative difficulties, all states that award
expert fees compensate for the time spent testifying, rather than for the time spent testifying
to expert knowledge. Most states leave the computation of the amount of the fee to the judge's
discretion.
Four approaches are used by different jurisdictions to determine which experts should
be compensated. The first, compensating certain experts (usually physicians) for their testi-
mony regardless of its content, relates more to the self-interest of certain experts than to any
conception of fairness to all litigants and experts. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-260
(West Supp. 1976) (additional compensation only for a "practitioner of the healing arts,
dentistry, and real estate appraisal"). The most common approach is to pay experts who give
any testimony that uses their expert skill or knowledge. This system is a compromise between
the goal of compensating for the use of an expert's special skills and the goal of judicial
economy. A third approach, compensating the expert only if he has given an expert opinion,
appears at first blush to be the most just. See, e.g., CoL. REv. STAT. § 13-33-102 (1974); IowA
CODE ANN. § 622.72 (West 1950); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13:3666A (West 1967); MIcH. COMP.
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witness would be compensated by the calling party whenever the
court and litigant take advantage of the expert's investment in his
training.
Ideally, the system should compensate the expert only when,
and to the extent that, it draws upon his special training. But it
would be anomalous if a system designed in part to relieve courts
of the burden of drawing distinctions between kinds of expert testi-
mony for purposes of compulsion were to require courts to draw
those same distinctions for compensation purposes. For reasons of
administrative ease, any expert whose appearance is compelled
should receive his reasonable fees for time spent testifying if he gives
any testimony employing his expert skill or training."
IV. RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM TO THE FEDERAL
DISCOVERY RULES
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
discovery of experts retained or specially employed by the opposing
party, but who will not be called as witnesses by that party, only
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.66 This limitation pre-
vents the unfairness that would result if a party were permitted to
benefit freely from his opponent's trial preparation.17 The rule fur-
LAws ANN. § 600.2164 (1968). Unfortunately, this approach is not a practical one, because
the wording of a question may determine whether the response sounds like "fact" or
"opinion" and because the courts must decide whether previously-formed or only newly-
formed opinions can qualify for the expert fee. See, e.g., Landry v. Stadium, 256 So. 2d 343
(La. Ct. of App. 1971). A fourth approach, paying expert fees only to experts who give opinion
but not fact testimony (presumably this is meant to include those whom this comment has
defined as general experts, see Bureau of Medical Economics v. Cossette, 44 Cal. App. 3d
supp. I, 118 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1974)), is attractive because it compensates those experts who
are least like ordinary witnesses. Once the court has determined that it is fair to compel an
expert to testify, however, there is no reason to favor general experts over other experts who
may also be required to give opinions.
1 If the court need not distinguish between types of expert testimony, computation of
an expert's "reasonable fees" should not be difficult. The expert can be paid his usual fees
for the period of time spent testifying. See, e.g., Bureau of Medical Economics v. Cossette,
44 Cal. App. 3d supp. I, 118 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1974); Green v. Jefferson Truck Service, Inc.,
274 So. 2d 396, 399 (La. Ct. of App. 1973).
11 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) and FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (relating to court-ordered
examinations). But see Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: An Empirical Study and a Proposal (pt. 2), 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169,
193. Professor Graham's survey found that discovery of opponent's experts not expected to
be called as witnesses takes place in a large percentage of cases. Experts who will be called
as witnesses by the opposing party may be discovered on a lesser showing. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4)(A).
V Any unfairness to the expert is mitigated by payment for the time spent testifying.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). The Advisory Committee Notes on discovery provide, how-
ever, that "a party may not obtain discovery simply by offering to pay fees and expenses."
48 F.R.D. 487, 505 (1970).
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ther prohibits discovery of experts informally consulted by a party"5
and allows unfettered discovery of experts who were occurrence wit-
nesses." The rules, however, do not address the question of whether
general experts and certain intermediate experts are subject to dis-
covery.7 0
Competing policies must be considered in determining the de-
gree to which these experts should be subject to discovery. Parties
should be entitled to discover all information "reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, 7 1 as well as
all information directly relevant to the pending action. Yet experts
who would not be compelled to testify at trial should also be pro-
tected from free discovery. The deposition of an expert who does not
appear at trial might be admissible as evidence under a hearsay
exception.7 Thus the litigant, under certain circumstances, may be
able to obtain the benefit of the expert's special skills free of charge.
More important, if litigants could obtain expert testimony by the
strategem of deposing experts who are not amenable to trial sub-
poenas, the goal of mitigating the unfairness in compelling expert
testimony would be frustrated.
The court therefore should utilize the procedure that is applica-
" "Subdivision (b)(4)(B) is concerned only with experts retained or specially consulted
in relation to trial preparation. Thus the subdivision precludes discovery against experts who
were informally consulted in preparation for trial, but not retained or specially employed."
Advisory Committee Notes, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504 (1970).
" The Advisory Committee stated that "the subdivision does not address itself to the
expert whose information was not acquired in preparation for trial but rather because he was
an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject
matter of the lawsuit. Such an expert should be treated as an ordinary witness." 48 F.R.D.
at 503. See also Comment, Discovery of Expert Information Under the Federal Rules, 10 U.
RICH. L. REv. 706, 718 (1976) (discussing the problem of depositions of experts who were actors
or viewers and also retained or specially employed by a party in anticipation of the litigation).
7, Experts not covered by rule 26(b)(4) include general experts and intermediate experts
who obtained their knowledge of the matters at issue from independent study. Professor
Graham suggests that discovery of "pure" experts should be permitted, but conditioned on
payment of the expert's reasonable fees. Presumably general experts and intermediate ex-
perts not covered by rule 26(b)(4) are included in this category. Graham, Discovery of Experts
under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An Analytical Study (pt. 1),
1976 U. Ia. L.F. 895, 934-43. Graham also concludes that even discovery of informally
consulted experts should be permitted under exceptional circumstances. Id. at 940.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
72 A litigant might depose an expert who would not be subject to subpoena for trial under
the standards set out above. Since the expert would thus be "unavailable," as is usually
required for the hearsay exception, that deposition could be used in lieu of the expert's live
testimony. Although in some respects the burden is greater on one who must appear at trial
than on an expert who will only be deposed because, for example, the expert can set the time
and place of the deposition, there is no justification for allowing a litigant to take advantage
of the expert's skill even under this less burdensome format.
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ble to trial subpoenas when an unwilling general or intermediate
expert moves either for a protective order 3 or to quash a deposition
subpoena. The burden should be upon the litigant to show his need
for the testimony. If the party makes an adequate showing, the court
should deny the expert's motion unless he demonstrates that it is
unreasonable to compel him rather than some other unwilling ex-
pert. This method will differ in two respects from that applied when
an expert is subpoenaed for trial. First, the litigant need only dem-
onstrate the probable uniqueness of the testimony. Since discovery
occurs early in the litigation, it is unreasonable to require parties at
that stage to establish conclusively the irreplaceability of the testi-
mony sought. The second variation follows from the first. In order
to prevent abuse of the relaxed standard for permitting deposition
of experts, the scope of the deposition should be limited, in certain
cases, to determining whether the expert in fact possesses irreplace-
able knowledge relevant to the litigation. This limitation will be
necessary only in cases in which the litigant claims that the expert
is an occurrence witness and the expert claims he is not. If the
limitation were not imposed, a litigant could claim that an expert
was an occurrence witness and depose the expert. Even if it became
apparent at the deposition that the expert was not an occurrence
expert, the litigant could continue deposing the expert concerning
his opinions and then introduce the deposition at trial, thus avoid-
ing the limitations placed on subpoenas for trial. If the parties agree
on the category in which the expert belongs, however, the only prob-
lem to be resolved is whether the expert should be deposed at all.
Under this system both general and intermediate experts could
be deposed whenever their testimony could also be compelled at
trial.74 In addition, intermediate experts could be deposed whenever
there is a conflict between the litigant and the expert over whether
the expert possesses irreplaceable information. In that event, dis-
covery would be limited to establishing whether or not the expert's
testimony is replaceable. If discovery reveals that the expert's testi-
mony is theoretically replicable, further discovery should be permit-
" An expert may seek a protective order denying or limiting discovery. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(c), 30(d).
11 See text and notes at notes 38-53 supra (general experts); text and notes at notes 54-
59 supra (intermediate experts). This severe restriction on the possibility of discovering
general experts should not unduly hamper discovery, since the information that could be
discovered from a general expert would usually be available from other sources, such as other
experts or publications. Since a party may depose even a general expert if he can show that
the testimony is not available from other sources, the system would give access to all informa-
tion of general experts likely to lead to admissible evidence.
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ted only if the standards for compelling the trial appearance of
intermediate experts with replicable knowledge are satisfied.75 If the
expert can be compelled to testify at trial, full discovery should be
allowed. Since the requirements for deposing an unwilling expert
are substantially identical to those for compelling testimony at trial,
courts will normally have to make only one decision on whether to
compel an expert to testify.
CONCLUSION
This comment has suggested that it is unfair to compel experts
to testify in all cases because expert testimony differs in kind from
ordinary testimony. Current approaches to defining the circumstan-
ces in which experts can be compelled to testify are often underpro-
tective of litigants or experts and wasteful of judicial resources. The
comment has attempted to balance the interests involved. It has
proposed a comprehensive approach to the problem that distin-
guishes among experts on the basis of the source of the expert's
knowledge and focuses on the question of whether the testimony is
in fact replaceable.7 6
The proposed approach varies the burden of proof depending on
the expert's relationship to the matters being litigated. Experts who
were not occurrence witnesses are accorded the benefit of a pre-
sumption that their testimony is irrepleacable. A party can over-
come this presumption by showing that the testimony is unavailable
from other sources; if this presumption is overcome, the court
should consider whether it is unreasonable to compel the particular
expert to testify instead of other unwilling experts. Because of the
nature of the testimony sought it is anticipated that parties will
have more difficulty overcoming the presumption for "general" than
for "intermediate" experts. Once the court has determined that an
expert may be compelled to appear, no additional distinctions be-
tween kinds of expert testimony need be made; any unfairness to
the expert in compelling this testimony can be mitigated by requir-
ing the litigant to pay the expert's reasonable fees.
Similar considerations apply in compelling discovery of ex-
perts. If a party contends that an expert's information is irreplacea-
ble but the expert contends that it is not, discovery should be lim-
11 See text and note at note 58 supra.
7' This comprehensive approach could be implemented either by interpreting the
"unreasonable or oppressive" standard for quashing subpoenas, see text and notes at notes
20-21 supra, to encompass the suggested standards or by amending rules governing sub-
poenas, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45, or rules governing discovery of experts. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4).
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ited to establishing such irreplaceability. Only if the party can show
that the expert can be compelled to testify should full discovery be
permitted.
Most courts have treated alike experts who were occurrence
witnesses and general and intermediate experts. By using presump-
tions protective of the latter two types of experts, presumptions that
can be overcome by an adequate demonstration of the need for the
expert's testimony, courts can achieve the goal of obtaining all rele-
vant testimony without unfairly burdening experts or unduly sacri-
ficing judicial economy.
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